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Legal and primary-group social controls
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The ultrasociality of human beings, unlike that of the social insects, is beset
by competition among social cooperators. Four social mechanisms to deal
with this problem are discussed: mutual monitoring, internalized restraint,
legal control and market mechanisms. Each is investigated in sociobiological
perspective.
This essay is a preliminary sketch of how sociobiology may be united with the
traditional sociological issues of social control and bureaucracy. Human beings, like
all fertile animals, are in direct competition with their kin (except their identical
twins) and neighbors for the food and shelter available in their environment. This
ubiquitous condition creates an obvious interest in controlling how other individuals
behave, best elaborated in David Wilson's (1980) deterrence theory. It can be
analyzed as a conflict of interests between the group-as-a-whole and each individual
as to how that individual should behave, thus getting into the problem of social
control. However, I believe it is more appropriate to reserve that mode of analysis
for the conflict of interests that emerges with social and ultrasocial forms of life.
In a wide range of ecologies, cooperation such as big animal hunting and irrigated
grain fields increases food resources and shelter from predators. But individuals are,
once again, in competition for the size of their shares of these increased resources.
At this level, however, a novel form of collective interest emerges: individual
competition for maximum share of the resources jeopardizes the benefits of
cooperation and the cooperative organization itself. Greedy quarrelling for
maximum share reduces the pool of resources to be shared. In ecologies where
cooperation can double or quadruple the per capita resources available, there is a
payoff for effective social control that protects the efficacy of cooperation from
individual greed. That such mechanisms are rare and fragile is the conclusion of
analyses coming both from the mathematical models of evolutionary biology
(Haldane, 1932; Williams, 1966; Wilson, 1975; Chapter 5; Wilson, 1980; Boorman
& Levitt, 1980), and the social sciences (Von Neumann &
.
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Morgenstern, 1944; Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1968, Schelling, 1971). Masters {this
volume) presents the issues in terms of "prisoner's dilemma" examples. My own
point of view {Campbell, 1972. 1975, 1979, 1982) can be summarized thus.
□
Ultrasociality refers to the most social of animal organizations, with full time
division of labor, specialists who gather no food but are fed by others, effective
sharing of information about sources of food and danger, self-sacrificial effort in
collective defense. This level has been achieved by ants, termites and humans in
several scattered archaic city-states. Inclusive fitness, kin-selection, and structured
deme theory {Wilson, 1980) adequately explain moderately social forms such as the
semi social wasps and baboons. In the social insects, the further route to
ultrasociality has been achieved by caste sterility, almost entirely removing genetic
competition among the cooperators; this route has not been available for human
urban societies. Instead, cultural evolution {including norms inhibiting human
selfishness, deceitfulness and cowardice) has been required.
The human route to ultrasociality is not fully understood, but a detailed
examination of present understanding of the route of the termites {extreme
inbreeding alternating occasionally with outbreeding which produces a generation of
siblings more closely related to leach other than to own offspring, making possible
caste sterility) and ; the route of the ants {haplodiploidy, which makes sisters more
closely ; related to each other than to own offspring, which when combined with sex
ratios favoring females, stabilizes brood care for parental ; offspring at expense of
own fertility) makes clear that the human route must have been different-it did not
involve the sterility of the cooperating specialities. Among the conceptual tool
available for reconstructing the human route are reciprocal altruism {clique
selfishness), moralistic aggression to punish defectors from reciprocal-altruist pacts,
the in-group as a socially inherited reciprocal-altruist pact, socially evolved beliefs
promising transcendant purposes, posthumous rewards for altruistic contribution to
group welfare at own expense, and transcendent sanctions against self-serving
behavior that jeopardizes group welfare. In general, biologically evolved supports
for preferences for altruistic behavior on the part of other group members do not
have the costs to inclusive fitness that tendencies to own self- sacrificial altruism
have. Moral norms, socially evolved with or
.
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without biological support, thus tend to be focused on other persons' behavior, not
one’s own..
Much hypothesized cultural evolution must achieve a kind of "group selection"
precluded among vertebrates at the purely biological level and achieved by
invertebrates only through caste sterility. " The models of cultural evolution of Boyd
& Richerson (1980) help here. Non-linear, multiple-social-parent transmission, with
a majority amplifying effect, pushes face-to-face groups to internal unanimity in the
absence of selection. This provides the raw material of ingroup homogeneity and
group-to-group heterogeneity prerequisite for group selection. Such selection would
come through differential group success, differential growth, conquest with cultural
imposition, voluntary attraction of converts, imitation etc. As a byproduct, striking
group-to-group differences also occur in functionally neutral beliefs and customs.
These acquire a secondary function as indicators of ingroup membership,
designating fellow reciprocal-altruists of the same clique.
This perspective on human social evolution is more loyal to the details of biological
evolution than are current over-emphases on kin selection theory which by omission
imply that human ultrasociality can be explained by the same evolutionary
mechanisms that explain the social insects. This more complex understanding of
human evolution produces a sociobiology much more readily reconciled with the
traditional understandings of the social sciences and the humanities. Light is thrown
on human ambivalence, deceit, cowardice, disloyalty; on the specific content of lists
of sins, commandments and taboos; on human intuitions of justice, equality and
equity; on the dynamics of ethnocentrism, nationalism and war; and on self-seeking
and nepotistic distortions of collectively-rational bureaucratic roles.
Emphasis on group selection is central to my argument. It is a minority point of
view. The issue was the focus of an important half- day subgroup discussion at
Monterey Dunes involving Alexander, Durham, Masters and myself, focused on
Durham's paper for illustrative purposes. The discussion has led me to back off
somewhat from an implication of my flamboyant title of 1975, "On the Conflicts
between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology and Moral
Tradition." For most sociobiologists and evolutionary theorists (Alexander, 1979),
sociocultural evolution cannot persistently produce behavior tendencies that result in
a net loss of biological inclusive fitness. Cultural evolution is dependent on
biologically evolved capacities; cultural items that reduced inclusive fitness would
never have
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evolved. Cultural evolution thus cannot conflict with biological evolution or reduce
biological inclusive fitness. I should have emphasized the conflict between
behavioral tendencies produced by biological evolution and those produced by
social evolution as mediated through moral indoctrination, beliefs about the
supernatural, and social organization. Some degree of group selection is always
going on. Haldane's and subsequent analyses point out that behavior traits that
benefit the group but involve sacrifice of individual inclusive fitness will be
undermined by individual competition within the group. The benefits to average
individual inclusive fitness that could come from self- sacrificially altruistic social
cooperation are thus precluded by the collectively self-defeating "genetic
competition among the cooperators" (Haldane, 1932; Williams, 1966). Any
mechanism that can overcome this self-defeating tendency will result in great gains
in biological inclusive fitness for the average gene, the average individual, the
breeding pool and the organized group. Therefore, cultural evolution of behavior
tendencies that furthers group effective self- sacrificial altruism would be strongly
selected for. On the other hand, as Hamilton ( 1964) has emphasized, the stronger
these tendencies, and the more collective prosperity they produce, the greater the
inclusive fitness payoff to being a successful "free rider" (Olson, 1968), parasitical
on the cooperative efforts of others without risking the costs to own inclusive
fitness.
Let us examine the issue in terms of a skeletonized model of the cultural evolution
of a general moral preaching. Assume some degree of "direct" effect of teaching-that
people tend, however slightly, to believe what they are told, and act according to
their beliefs. According to the mathematical models of Boyd & Richerson (1980), a
cultural evolution of moral preachments from parents to offspring under an analog
of individual selection social transmission would produce moral preachings of the
nature "Get others to cooperate but be a free-rider yourself." "Don't be a sucker."
"Better a procreating coward than a dead hero." When this model is expanded to
include multiple, across- lineage, social-transmission of "parenting," the same type
of moral teaching is favored in their linear model with individual selection. Only in
their non-linear group-selection of teaching and preaching do we get conditions that
would select for public moralizing that favors group advantage at individual cost.
No doubt self-serving preachings such as the above often go on in the privacy of
homes, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously. We can envisage on an
individual selection basis a double
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standard of preaching. an altruistic morality for exhortation to others, a self-serving
one for own offspring. I anticipate that in the long run such a system would not work
to produce complex social coordination, even though it would end up with the
altruistic preachings heard by the offspring generation being many times more
numerous than the selfish ones. I am more hopeful for another analysis: if one's own
private preachings of selfish opportunism to one's offspring undermined the
tendency of others to behave cooperatively, and if the payoffs for cooperation were
high, situations could occur in which it would be of net inclusive fitness advantage
to preach the altruistic message to one's own offspring even if they behaved
accordingly. Does it require something like group selection to create a situation in
which such a choice is presented to an individual? Or can it be achieved purely on
an individual selection basis?

□
At Monterey Dunes we did not discuss the group selection issue for the termites and
ants, but I have elsewhere been challenged by Alexander for upholding the oldfashioned thesis that group selection is required for their ultrasociality too. With due
attention to a considerable portion of the relevant literature I have come (Campbell,
1982) to the conclusion that where proto-social insects find themselves in an
ecology in which multiple brood care is required, it becomes in the inclusive fitness
interests of an auxiliary brood carer to distribute a fertility inhibiting pheromone to
fellow auxiliary brood-carers even at the expense of having own fertility inhibited.
At this initial stage the insects are only semi-social, the mother or sister "queen" still
gathers food for herself and for the immature individuals just as do the sterile
"workers." There is no structural differentiation or behavioral division of labor
except for fertility. Preserving this sterile worker caste effectively removes genetic
competition among the cooperators, and makes possible the subsequent evolution of
ultrasociality, with the adult queen and adult soldiers being fed by the adult workers.
It is the preservation of this sterility that makes the unit of selection the cooperating
social nest, including the fertile queen. Selection for socially effective self-sacrificial
altruism is not undermined be genetic competition among the cooperators, since the
cooperators are all sterile. Now in the formal mathematical models of "group
selection" in population genetics, only groups of fertile organisms are considered;
since there is no group selection for groups of queens and nests (indeed
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they compete most ruthlessly), the social insects are rejected as instances of group
selection. I must be more careful about my terminology. What I and WynneEdwards (1962) and William Morton Wheeler (1928) were talking about is in
today's usage better called "selection by social organization and not by participating
individual" (but the word "group" used to be a near synonym for social
organization).
SOCIAL CONTROL MECHANISMS
Mechanisms of social control serve two functions: coordination and restraint.
Coordination is the function of routing, routinizing and in- formation sharing which
reduces chaos and maximizes coordination in ways that do not oppose human nature
or individual preference. As a pure type, coordination is supported by individualdispositional preferences, assisting the individual to choose from a set of neutral
behavioral alternatives the one that optimizes group function, the one that is for this
reason preferred by the individual once designated, for it optimizes a group function
from which the individual profits, and at no individual cost relative to other
alternatives.
Social controls involving restraint also focus on optimizing efficacious collective
action. But in contrast to coordination, they appear in situations in which individual
dispositions favor some action other than the collectively optimal one. As we have
seen, given the vertebrate ecology of genetic competition among cooperators,
evolutionary biology makes some degree of such bias inevitable, and directly
predicts the direction of the individual-dispositional bias against which the restraint
is directed. Thus food sharing is essential for division-of-labor social organizations:
genetic competition predicts a bias in the direction of under-generosity, not overgenerosity. Truth telling is essential for the information sharing which produces the
great economy of cognition (Campbell, 1965b) which makes social life so much
more productive than individual-the direction of bias is for self-serving dishonesty,
not for self-sacrificial dishonesty. Audits on tax returns are based on anticipated bias
in the direction of under-paying, not overpaying. A bureaucrat's personnel choices
will over-favor own children and other kin, rather than be biased against them. Selfsaving cowardice in battle is more common than foolhardy bravery. All of these
obvious and well-known biases have not been able to eliminate genetic competition
among the cooperators. All create problems of social control of the type I have
designated
as
restrain
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For purposes of this paper, four mechanisms of social control can be delineated.
(1) Mutual monitoring
This includes face-to-face approval and disapproval, ostracism, conformity pressure,
shame and pride. All group members share in both detecting violations and
enforcing sanctions.
(2) Internalized restraint
This category includes processes of conscience or superego, the pain of guilt feelings,
and the fear of supernatural sanctions. There is self- monitoring of norm violation
and self-punishment.
(3) Legal control
Overt rules about offenses and punishments are in this mode. The detection of
violations and the enforcement of penalties are delegated to specialists such as
police, militia, tax collectors and judiciary. Sanctions include job loss,
imprisonment, fines, exile and death. Rational bureaucratic systems are included in
this category, as is government by administrative regulation.
(4) Market mechanisms
In such processes the intelligently selfish choices of all individuals curb the greed of
individuals by making it unprofitable, as in the "invisible hand" of laissez-faire
economics and libertarian political theory.
The last two, legal control and market mechanism, are currently the focal alternative
poles being advocated in political discussion. Western democracies are based on a
compromised mixture of the two. It seems to me that sociobiology has an important
critique to make of each of them.
The first two, mutual monitoring and internalized restraint, seem unduly neglected
in modern considerations of legal control and market mechanisms. Including them
will help us understand both why the last two have worked when they have, and why
they so often fail.
The first three, mutual monitoring, internalized restraints and legal control,
represent to some extent an evolutionary sequence, partly one of biological
evolution, but mainly a product of cultural evolution.
Mutual monitoring covers most of the "primary group" or "face-to- face" group
social controls described in the older sociology. The
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anthropological concept of "shame" culture overlaps. Primate sociality as reviewed
by Boehm, Goodall, Gruter and Itani {this volume) exists, at this level. Trivers' {
1971) concepts of an innate predisposition to ; form "reciprocal altruist" pacts, and
to show "moralistic aggression" when such compacts are violated, and Axelrod and
Hamilton's {1981) "tit-for-tat" contingent cooperation and retaliation belong here.
These are important concepts urgently needing elaboration beyond the dyad to
multi-person groups. The ethological study of human facial expression, the
autonomic nervous system and hormonal reactions associated with face-to-face
disapproval, opinion-minority status and lying all fit in here.
In my judgment, it will turn out that many of the mechanisms that make mutual
monitoring effective are stubbornly innate in human beings, and that they can be
counted on to be at work creating a kind of ingroup solidarity, homogeneity of
belief, and discipline in even arbitrarily assembled aggregates of persons who
repeatedly interact in small groups. Indeed, research on social processes in
experimental and social psychology laboratories show that such group formation
processes begin to occur in as little as two hours. This fact is of extreme importance
in understanding the dynamics of bureaucracy and large- scale organizations, but is
still overlooked in human organizational theory.
In practice, reciprocal altruism can be translated as clique selfishness. While it
may be true that a complete theory of games analysis would show cooperation to be
mutually beneficial even if everyone were in the cooperating group, in practice
reciprocal-altruist pacts and the inhibition of parasitical free-riding by mutual
monitoring are the most common and most feasible for small groups, as the
economist Olson {1968) has shown. In addition, both the lower primates and
humans achieve their group solidarity in a context of competition with, or threat
from, other groups of conspecifics. The formation of an ingroup solidarity is always
accompanied by an outgroup hostility, as ubiquitously noted in studies of
ethnocentrism {LeVine & Campbell, 1972). One of the most ubiquitous principles
of that literature is that ingroup social control is enhanced under conditions of
outgroup threat.
It is the common circumstance of modern social organization, in public or private
bureaucracies, that they are made up of many separate face-to-face groups,
connected by messages and messengers. It follows from our mutual monitoring
principle that each face-to-face assemblage tends to become an ingroup whose
solidarity tends to be motivated by treating other units as outgroups. In this process,
orders
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from higher administration can be reacted to as though they were enemy
impositions, and cooperative efforts to subvert them can be supported by mutual
monitoring. The engineering department and the sales department can play ingroup
and outgroup. roles to each other. Customers and clients can become outgroups
disrupting cozy ingroup patterns. Given human nature, both as observed and
predicted from evolutionary tendencies, such occurrences are not occasional,
isolated instances, but are unavoidable, universal tendencies. If they fail to produce
major problems for large organizations it is because other factors keep them in
check, not because they are absent.
Thus mutual monitoring as a means of social control is effective at the small group
level, but can easily become organized around purposes that are contrary to the
larger group's collective interests. Keeping these interests co-aligned is one of the
major unsolved problems of organizational design. Max Weber gave us a theory of
bureaucratic rationality that failed to take these processes into account. Some such
optimistic assumption that ''as it is planned so shall it be carried out seems endemic
among legislators and administrative designers as ever larger bureaucratic structures
get created. Yet actual studies of bureaucracies (e.g. Blau, 1963) support the popular
concept of inflexible, lethargic, self-serving bureaucracy. Sociobiology thus
provides two grounds for predicting distortions of bureaucratic rationality. The first
is the individual's selfish and nepotistic biases, particularly biasing when
exemplified by those in high administrative rank. The second is the clique
selfishness, the tendency for face-to-face ingroup formation with clique solidarity
interests athwart those of the larger collective.
Bureaucracies, large organizations, states (Masters, this volume) would work with
bureaucratic rationality if the only control requirements were those of coordination,
none of restraint, if individuals had no interests divergent from those of the
collective, if they were self- guiding and self-monitoring solely in terms of collective
interests at the highest level of the social organization in which they participate.
While it is turn-of-the-century-old-fashioned to use the social insects in such
discussions (Campbell, 1975), I do find in them an enlightening comparison as to
what human beings are not but conceivably could have been-a role that science
fiction can also play. The ants, termites and bees are such self-monitoring automata
in their social systems, executing their micro-purposes with extemporaneous
intelligence in the face of local obstacles, micro-purposes which fit into generally
competent collective action (in the absence of such novel
.
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ecological features as ant poison). The 12 or so pheromones with which they
exchange signals {Wilson, 1971) have the function of coordination, not restraint.
None of their division of labor goes into monitoring each other’s behavior for
compliance. A major reason for this, as I see it, is that the elimination of genetic
competition among the cooperators has made the inclusive fitness interests of each
worker and soldier exactly that of collective nest or hive survival.
Internalized restraint, traditionally achieved through religion and the awe- and fearinspired morality accompanying it, has been the central focus of my major
contribution to sociobiology { Campbell, 1975, 1965a, 1965b, 1972, 1979, 1982). A
dozen or so archaic city- states and nations {each probably independently) achieved
ultrasociality, with fulltime priests, governors and soldiers who gathered no food,
being fed by the workers, with granaries and large civic buildings and often with
apartment-house concentrations. All were theocracies. All invested human effort
heavily in temples, funeral monuments and graves for their rulers. All believed in
supernatural gods and god- I stories far more incredible {from a modern scientific
point of view) J than those of the simpler human societies that have remained for
anthropologists to study-and those are incredible enough. The economist and
evolutionist must ask what inclusive fitness function led to the selection of this
apparently lavish waste of human energy, tools and the sacrifice of useful
domesticated animals and servants. These belief and action systems were obviously
products of a cultural evolutionary process.
While the Boyd arid Richerson {1980) model predicts the occurrence of bizarre
beliefs that are neither functional nor dysfunctional, it would not predict such a
widespread uniformity of such apparent violations of economic and biological
efficiency. We are thus required to seek a function. I see that function in achieving
social control of the kind of restraint that is effective {to some degree) even when
human supervisors and policemen and worldly rewards and punishments are not
present to shape individual behavior in the collectively optimal form. The beliefs
about Valhallas that reward brave soldiers killed in battle, or the hells that punish
cowards, thieves and liars, were legitimated and made more credible by the royal
funeral waste testifying to the leaders' belief in an afterlife. The fit between the
biases in human nature {that follow from the fact of genetic competition among
competitors) and lists of religious sin and temptation explicit or implied in the
commandments is also convincing. The emphasis on carnal, biological, human
nature in the Christian tradition
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(at least) further fits. The genes say "Thou shalt covet"; ultra-social human culture
says (or used to say) "Thou shalt not covet." While the detailed picture is more
complex and confusing than this, I know of no better evolutionary explanation for
religious moralizing and temple building or for the current energy investment in
religion, even though other functions are no doubt also served.
Even though self-monitoring, moral, dutiful persons (whose effective altruism goes
far beyond situational opportunism or long range hedonism) come out of nonreligious families, the general culture from which they come has both religious
ancestors and neighbors. But whether or not a religious justification is required for
such a culturally- induced self-monitoring restraint, internalized moral norms
actually acted upon are of obvious use in a social organization. The seeds of world
tragedy, of great losses in current human inclusive fitness such as Alexander (this
volume) refers to, lie in the fact that self-monitoring internalized social control
systems are necessary for effectiveness in national warfare, and are enhanced (just as
is mutual monitoring) by ingroup-outgroup polarization between religions or
nationalistic versions of religion. Tragically, nation-worship seems less incredible,
less supernatural, to the modern secularized mind than do the reifications of
collective interests found in the great religions of purportedly universal scope.
Legal control is a universal feature of all modern nations, going hand in hand with
administrative bureaucracy. It has worked reasonably well in many nations for many
historical periods. It is not conspicuously successful in most of the new third world
nations, and its failure is being announced in some well developed ones, including
such one- time paragons of national success as England and the United States. Given
our sociobiological model of human nature, it is remarkable that it ever worked. As
a pure form, without mutual monitoring or internalized restraint, with all detection
of non-compliance and delivery of sanctions delegated to specialists, the required
size of this specialist corps becomes unaffordably large, even if the self-interest and
nepotistic biases of these legal-control specialists is disregarded.
The judicial system is more heavily used to further self-and-nepotistic interests than
to curb them. The concept of "loophole," the literal legalistic interpretations of the
law that subvert announced legislative intent, illustrate one aspect of the problem.
Language is an inherently imperfect tool, which is used effectively only when shared
contexts fill in the meaning, as the concept of "indexicality" points out (Putnam,
1975;
Barnes
&
Law,
1976).
But
law
in
its
effort
to
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achieve universality and fairness must pretend that words have situation-free
constant meanings, denying their indexicality. Written and interpreted "literally," the
wordings allow loopholes and unintended uses never envisaged in their construction.
Perhaps more than half of our lawyers and legal research efforts are now employed
to serve collectively biasing individual interests.
One must conclude that legal social control can only have worked well when
supported by mutual monitoring and internalized restraint. This internalized
restraint would have to cover not only restraint from violating the letter of the law,
but also restraint from violating the public-interest announced intent of the law. It
would also have to involve restraint in use of the law against fellow citizens in the
service of opportunistic greed.
If the internalized restraint that makes legal social control work has to a
considerable degree been based on consciences coming from social indoctrination
employing transcendent religious belief, then secularization and also religious
pluralism in which ethical norms apply only to co-religionists, both may lead to self
defeating political efforts to increase the burden of social control delegated to legal
and bureaucratic processes.
Market mechanisms in which the intelligent selfishness of
all curbs the selfish greed of others, are the methods of social control recommended
by laisse-faire economics, in which the only governmental interference with human
nature allowed is the protection of private property and inherited wealth. Mancur
Olson (1968) employs the tools of mainstream economics which are characterized
by the hope that an "invisible hand" emerging from competition will provide the
restraints needed for collective action. But he shows that this hope is wrong, that
basic economic assumptions show that if each person is intelligently selfish in
choices, "collective goods," including the benefits of cooperation, will be lost. He
concludes that to solve the "free-rider" problem, compulsion is needed. For small
groups whose members cannot readily join and quit, mechanisms such as I have
included under mutual monitoring suffice. For larger groups, he judges legal
compulsion is required. Thus he recommends compulsory taxation and compulsory
union membership. I find his analysis compelling, and in keeping with sociobiology,
except for the un- examined assumption that legal compulsion can be made to work.
In agreement with Olson, I am inclined to reject the efficacy of market mechanisms,
even though I admire their efficacy for social system- tuning in labor supply
allocation. (The mixture of government
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controlled intervention in income and services redistribution with j market
mechanisms, which Friedman ( 1962) has introduced in the "negative income tax"
and the "voucher system" for education and housing subsidies seem to me worth
thorough consideration.) Market mechanisms, like legal control, seem to have
worked well in some settings in the past. My conclusion is again that they only did
so when supported by the internalized moral restraints and pride which the culture of
traditional beliefs and mutual monitoring provided.
The task of thinking through the problems in social control that are created by
genetic competition among the cooperators has just begun.

